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To the extent that contingencies arise, not anticipated in the schedule, coordination requires communication to give notice of deviations from planned or predicted conditions, or to give instructions for changes in activity to adjust to these deviations. We may label coordination based on pre-established schedules coordination by plan, and coordination that involves transmission of new information coordination by feedback.
[March and Simon, 1958; p182] The idea that coordination -the alignment of actions among interdependent actors (Gulati, Lawrence& Puranam, 2005; Heath & Staudenmayer, 2000) can occur through two distinct "regimes" -either through ongoing communication and mutual adjustment or through predefined plans and standards -is hardly novel or exciting in itself. However it invites intriguing speculations when coupled with the insight that organizational boundaries often divide activities that are coordinated through plans and schedules, but enclose activities that require feedback and mutual adjustment to be coordinated with each other (Thompson, 1967) . Arguments that link optimal organizational forms to the nature of coordination requirements have been the mainstay of structural contingency theory (Barnard, 1938; March and Simon, 1958; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 1967) and under a broader definition of coordination requirements, indeed also of transaction cost theorizing (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1976; 1985) .
These ideas have of late been rejuvenated by the contributions of several scholars who have used the principles of modularity to understand the internal organization and boundaries of firms (Baldwin & Clark, 2000; Ethiraj & Levinthal, 2004; Galunic & Eisenhardt, 2001a; Helfat & Eisenhardt, 2000; Langlois, 2001; Sanchez & Mahoney, 1996; Schilling, 2000) . Within this literature, it is often suggested that modular interfaces that partition complex activity systems into parts with dense interdependencies within themselves but relatively fewer interdependencies between them, can also function as organizational boundaries. In particular, there are two ways in which this idea is presented in the literature. The first proposes a link between product and organizational architecture (Baldwin & Clark, 2000; Puranam, 2001; Sanchez & Mahoney, 1996; Schilling & Steensma, 2001) , whereas the second extends this link to ownership (Hoetker, 2002; Schilling & Steensma, 2001) , suggesting that modular production enables market based linkages between activities.
The proposition that product level modularity can influence modularity in organization and ownership is a valuable contribution to the study of organizations, and refocuses our attention towards the role of organizational and ownership boundaries in demarcating distinct regimes of coordination. While undoubtedly useful, this line of thinking inherits some of the methodological weaknesses identified with older structural contingency theorizing, as well as generates some new points of contention. In our view, there are two critical questions that the literature on organizational modularity must engage with in order to contribute effectively to our understanding of organization design.
First, what is the link between organizational and product interfaces? The carry-over of ideas about technological interfaces to organizational interfaces usually occurs with a corresponding assumption that interfaces either exist and partition activity completely, or do not. In contrast, in the tradition of organization design, the division of labor has not (necessarily) been equated with standardized interfaces and simplified interactions between the components of labor so divided. For instance, Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) make clear that task decomposition and the creation of modules (differentiation) goes hand in hand with mechanisms for coordination that penetrate the boundaries of the resulting modules (integration). In the context of interfirm relationships, a number of authors have commented on the existence of fairly thick forms of coordination between as well as within firms -far from being partitioned off from each other through thin interfaces, there may often be substantial permeability of firm boundaries (Bradach & Eccles, 1989; Grandori, 1997; Gulati, Lawrence& Puranam, 2005b) .
Second, where do organizational or product interfaces come from? In the modularity literature, the interfaces that partition activity into modular subsystems are treated more or less exogenously, with little indication of how they are developed much as the comparative discussion of coordination by plan and feedback largely fails to explain where plans and standards come from. This omission makes the modularity literature vulnerable to a charge of technological determinism (as was structural contingency theory).
Our goal in this paper is to tackle these issues with a view to assist in a fuller realization of the potential for ideas about modularity to advance theory on organization design. We approach this task by first bringing some definitional clarity to what interfaces mean in organizational contexts, and how product interfaces differ from organizational interfaces. Second, we propose a dynamic model of how interfaces are formed, that rests on the concept of systemic knowledge. Systemic knowledge refers to what is known about the underlying patterns of interdependence between tasks. As systemic knowledge accumulates, it is possible to define organizational interfaces (i.e. rely on plans and standards based coordination) that allow the separation of activity without having to rely on mutual adjustment (Jacobides and Billinger, 2006) . However, systemic knowledge itself accumulates through mutual adjustment experiences. Therefore, coordination through interfaces must be preceded by a regime of unstructured coordination involving communication and mutual adjustment. Further, once adopted an interface-based coordination regime actively impedes the return to a unstructured coordination regime as organizations become less experienced at unstructured coordination. We study the descriptive and normative implications of this negative feedback process, and draw implications for how organizational boundaries are formed and dissolve (Jacobides, 2005) . Our analysis thus suggests that rather than simply view plan and feedback as two alternate regimes of coordination which organizational designers select from, fresh insights are generated by focusing on the linkages between the two.
Organizational Interfaces: What they are and how they work
In most general terms, an interface describes how elements of a system interact with each other. When the system is a piece of hardware, such as a PC, the elements are various components such as motherboard, graphics chip, LCD screen etc. and interfaces refer to the physical and electronic connections between these components. When the system in question is a software program, the elements of the system are various sub-routines and program modules, while the interfaces refer to sequencing of execution, and information transfer between software modules through the use of common variables or data. Most relevant to our discussion, when the system refers to an organization, the elements are various organizational sub-units, and interfaces describe the nature of communication and shared decision-making across these sub-units, as embodied in plans, standard operating procedures, integrating managers and cross-unit teams (Galbraith, 1974; Tushman & Nadler, 1978) .
Interfaces are useful concepts to understand the architecture of complexity, because they demarcate the sub-systems that comprise the system as well as the manner in which sub-systems link to each other. It is important to note that interfaces refer not only to where the partitions in a complex system lie, but also the nature of those partitions. Two attributes of interfaces are of particular interest to students of modularity: a) the extent to which interfaces are "thick" or "thin" -which captures the amount of interaction between elements, b) the extent to which interfaces are "well-specified" vs. "poorly specified"-the degree of detail with which interactions between the linked elements of a system can be described before they occur.
To understand the distinction between thickness and specification, consider standard operating procedures that may allow two units to exchange large volumes of information through technological systems or engage in complex coordination tasks but in a very structured, pre-determined format. In contrast, committees or crossfunctional teams allow for a relatively smaller volume of interaction, but of a highly non-structured nature, which allows for unstructured coordination (Langlois, 2001 ).
This distinction between the thickness of interfaces and their specification mirrors the distinction drawn by Daft and Lengel (1986) between information volume and richness. Daft and Lengel refined earlier views on information processing (Galbraith, 1977; Tushman & Nadler, 1978) to suggest that increasing volume of information exchange is only useful when problems can be framed in such a way that more information leads to resolution. However, when problems are unstructured, equivocal and ambiguous, then it is the richness of information rather than its volume that matters. Communication media that permit rich information transfer are those that permit real-time human interactions, such as collocation, video-conferencing and telephones.
Concepts similar to unstructured coordination have been discussed by other scholars under names such as integrated problem solving (von Hippel, 1998) , technical dialog (Monteverde, 1995) or qualitative coordination (Langlois, 2001 ).
Thus the "thickness" of an interface between any two units may characterize the amount of information exchange and coordination between two units, but the fact that the interface is "poorly specified" refers to the large volume of information flow and coordination that is unstructured. Thus, thickness and specification are distinct but not orthogonal concepts; interface thickness refers to the total amount of coordination, whereas (the lack of) interface specification refers to the volume of unstructured coordination; the latter is a subset of the former.
The distinction between thickness and specification of interfaces suggests an important distinction between modularity in technology and organization. In designed artifacts such as hardware and software, regardless of their thickness, interfaces must always be well-specified in a functioning product. In contrast, both thickness and specification of organizational interfaces matter, and the benefits of separating activity within organizations through interfaces depends on both aspects. If anything, it is possible that the critical parameter may be the degree of specification of organizational interfaces -the extent to which the interface avoids the need for rich, unstructured coordination. This is because given the constantly falling costs of Information Technology (IT), the costs of transmitting large volumes of structured information are unlikely to prove to be binding constraints in organization design; however, rich unstructured coordination continues to rely significantly on face-to-face communication, for which the key constraints remain human information processing capacities.
We therefore argue that in organizations, as opposed to technological systems, the key issue is not complete separability and independence of action across subsystems but rather the extent to which the nature of interdependence is fully predictable. Situations of complete independence and the resulting ability to operate in a perfectly parallel way are rare in organizations (Thompson, 1967) and even rarer in terms of the ability of organizational architects to discover such perfect decouplings (Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004) . Interdependence between organizational units is ubiquitous, and may even require ongoing coordination and mutual adjustment between them (Thompson, 1967) but if such patterns of adjustment are fully predictable ex ante, then coordination is a "routine" affair (Gulati et al, 2005) . Thus, the degree of specification of organizational interfaces is the key theoretical variable of interest.
Well-specified interfaces work by specifying in advance exactly what each sub-system that links to another must do. For instance, two interdependent individuals may coordinate their activities by communicating and through joint decision-making; alternately a well-specified interface such as a standard operating procedure may simply specify exactly what each must do individually so that their joint actions are coordinated. It is in this sense that well-specified interfaces "embed" coordinationthey enable linked systems to act in a coordinated manner without having to explicitly engage in coordination, by specifying exactly what each sub-system must do in order for the aggregate system to work effectively (Baldwin & Clark, 2000; Ethiraj & Puranam, 2004; Sanchez & Mahoney, 1996) . Table 1 provides some examples of well-specified and poorly specified organizational interfaces. Intermediate degrees of interface specification are also possible, arising from different weighted combinations of the high and low specification mechanisms. For instance, one can envisage organizational interfaces 1 We think that Thompson' s classic treatment of interdependence does not make this point clearly enough, to the detriment of further development of these ideas. Reciprocal interdependence refers to the circular direction of information flows without reference to the intrinsic difficulties involved in coordination. For extended discussions of these points, see Gulati, Lawrence and Puranam, 2005. that rely primarily on unstructured, face-to-face coordination, on anonymous, standardized operating procedures, and some combination of the two. In fact, except in the most routinized situations, we believe that organizational interfaces are more often somewhere in the "swollen middle" (Hennart, 1993) . This underlines the important distinction between modularity in products and organizations-interfaces of intermediate specification may be useful in organizational settings, while inconceivable in the product domain.
Interface specification vs. Thickness: An example
To crystallize the distinction between interface specification and thickness, we present an example of a hypothetical organizational modularization problem, using the commonly used device known as a task structure matrix (Baldwin & Clark, 2000) .
The problem is a stylized example of product commercialization, with the various component tasks and their interdependencies indicated as usual in Table 2a . As is standard in such representations, an x in row j column k indicates that task j depends on task k. The representation allows for one-way dependence (a single x below/above the diagonal) or interdependence (with symmetric x's below and above the diagonal). Table 2b shows the same problem after it has been "modularised" into three groups of tasks-module 1 (product design), module 2(media) and module 3(packaging). An off diagonal x pertains to a sequencing issue; activity i cannot be performed till activity j is performed. A set of x's symmetrically above and below the axes indicates need for ongoing coordination-"cycling"-activity i depends on j and j depends on i.
There are three interfaces in this representation (between module 1 and 2, 2 and 3 and 1 and 3). The one between module 2 and 3 is the thinnest-there is no dependence between them at all. The activities in these two modules can in fact proceed in parallel, require no ongoing coordination, can be measured and rewarded separately, can benefit from specialization and can benefit from rapid reconfiguration.
The interface between module 1 and 2 is still relatively thin, though thicker than that between modules 2 and 3. The interface between modules 1 and 3 are the thickest, with the most number of dependencies and interdependencies.
However, note that from this representation alone, we cannot say whether the benefits of modularity are greater at the 1-3 interface or at the 1-2 interface (though both are certainly lower than at the 2-3 interface). This is because this representation tells us little about how specified these interfaces are -the extent to which the crossmodule interactions represented by the x's in Figure 2 can be described in detail before they occur. For instance, it is clear from Figure 2b that the design of the media campaign cannot occur before engineering design, prototyping and manufacture; but what is not clear is the extent of unstructured coordination required between the media campaign designers ad the engineering team for the former to design an appropriate campaign that highlights technical features of the product appropriately.
Indeed it is possible that this single x may represent more equivocality and need for unstructured coordination than the three x's that appear in the 1-3 interface.
We have consciously chosen an illustration that pertains to organizational rather than product modularity. As a contrast, one can imagine a similar diagram showing the sub-modules within a software programme or a piece of hardware; in such designed artefacts, if they are functioning well, there can be very little doubt about the nature of interactions. Physical tolerances, information flows, sequencing must all be fully specified for the artefact to function.
In sum, because of the separation of activity they enable, well-specified (as opposed to thick or thin) organizational interfaces are the basis for defining organizational and ownership boundaries. Understanding how such interfaces are formed can therefore generate insights on changes in the division of activity within and between firms.
A dynamic model of organizational interface creation
Our goal in this section is to outline a model that describes the dynamics of interface formation. Our model represents an organization with two organizational sub-units. The two units are interdependent, so that their activities must be coordinated in order to optimize organizational performance. The two sub-units may be related vertically or horizontally. For instance, these may be design and manufacturing units, or two product development groups working on sub-systems within a complex system. We define "systemic knowledge" as the knowledge about the nature of interdependence between sub-systems that is essential for defining interfaces between the two units. Such knowledge cannot be assumed; often the nature of interactions between sub-systems, and indeed of the location of boundaries between sub-systems may be unknown to an organization designer. Yet over time, as the personnel in the two units interact, they are likely to build a stock of systemic knowledge as they begin to understand the true nature of interdependence between activities in the two units.
We define "unstructured coordination" as a process of mutual adjustment supported by frequent and bi-directional communication. The hallmark of unstructured coordination is that it is effective even when systemic knowledge is imperfect or non-existent. Thus, the individuals in the two sub-units of our organization may be able to coordinate their activities through a process of trial-anderror learning even in the absence of detailed knowledge about how their actions are interdependent. This process of collective trial-and-error learning is what we refer to as unstructured coordination. While unstructured coordination can take place even in the absence of systemic knowledge, it is also a basis for building systemic knowledge.
Indeed such knowledge is more likely to be gathered through unstructured coordination efforts than through highly structured information exchange; understanding the full ramifications of changes in one sub-system to another subsystem is more likely if communication between them is not constrained by predefined topics and channels of information. We therefore assume that systemic knowledge t S is a concave increasing function of cumulative experience at unstructured coordination t V . The concavity builds in diminishing marginal returns, which is a ubiquitous assumption about knowledge building processes. Thus, the relationship between systemic knowledge and coordination experience must satisfy
While systemic knowledge about the nature of interdependence is being accumulated through unstructured coordination, over time the organization also becomes more adept at unstructured coordination itself. Repeated interactions give rise to trust, interpersonal routines, and common language, which together enhance the efficacy of mutual adjustment between them. Therefore, over time, an organization's competence at unstructured coordination improves. Consistent with standard learning curve formulations, we model this effect through a reduction in the costs of unstructured coordination per unit t c as a convex decreasing function of cumulative experience. The relationship between the per unit costs of coordination and coordination experience must satisfy:
Finally, we assume that the extent of unstructured coordination t U necessary to manage inter-unit interdependence at any point of time decreases with systemic knowledge. As the individuals in the two sub-units build systemic knowledge and gain a better understanding of how their actions are interdependent, they are able to embed coordination into standards, rules and procedures, instead of relying on unstructured coordination. We therefore assume that the extent of unstructured coordination required between the units to manage interdependence reduces as a convex decreasing function of systemic knowledge; the convexity reflects the assumption that it is never possible to eliminate entirely the need for unstructured coordination, because systemic knowledge is ultimately the product of learning by bounded rational individuals -it is unlikely to be perfect. Further, we allow for a distinction between the existence of systemic knowledge and its utilization to define interface standards. We denote by 
The preceding conditions embody the assumptions on which we build our theoretical arguments. To complete the specification of our model, we also state two identities. The first equation simply specifies the accumulation function for coordination experience
The second states that coordination costs t C are equal to the volume of unstructured coordination multiplied by the cost per unit of unstructured coordination.
The model specification implied by 1-5 captures a fundamental asymmetry between the two coordination regimes. In an unstructured coordination regime (i.e. no interfaces) the total costs of coordination must decline over time simply because of increasing coordination competence resulting from accumulated coordination experience (2), but the volume of unstructured coordination remains constant. In contrast, defining interfaces affects both the volume of unstructured coordination (4) as well as the cost per unit of coordination. Specifically, because interfaces curtail the volume of coordination at any point in time, they also result in slower accumulation of coordination experience (4). Investing in interfaces therefore not only reduces the extent of coordination required at any point in time but also a) slows down the rate at which per unit coordination costs decline c) as well as the rate at which systemic knowledge is built.
There are three important implications of these effects. First, the total costs of coordination may be lower or higher in an interface-based coordination regime than in an unstructured coordination regime. Relative to an unstructured coordination regime, introducing interfaces decreases the extent of coordination necessary, but also raises the per unit cost of coordination. This suggests a boundary condition on when an interface based coordination regime is preferable to an unstructured coordination regime (purely on a coordination cost basis-this does not account for the benefits of interface specification such as gains from specialization or superior monitoring and measurement). Put simply, interfaces improve coordination only when the "volume reduction" effect dominates the "cost increase" effect.
Second, delaying interface definition (i.e. "turning on later" may lead to higher levels of systemic knowledge. This is because the level of systemic knowledge at time t will be higher in an unstructured coordination regime than in an interfacebased coordination regime, because of the slower accumulation of coordination experience in the latter. An interface introduced at time t will therefore be better specified -have more systemic knowledge to draw on-than one that was introduced in t0, and from time t onwards, will always have lower levels of unstructured coordination compared to a system in which the interface was introduced at time t0.
Delayed transition to interface-based coordination may therefore help to control coordination costs.
Third, coordination competence (as measured by per unit costs of coordination) is typically likely to be lower in an organization that adopts an interface based coordination regime. This turns on its head the conventional wisdom that organizations with high competence at unstructured coordination are less likely to invest in interface-based coordination. This is a particularly important consideration if we believe that rarely but surely, exogenous shocks to the system change underlying patterns of interdependencies and destroy existing systemic knowledge (and therefore interfaces). Building interfaces impedes the formation of competence at unstructured coordination, which organizations must fall back on when interfaces are destroyed.
Thus, shocks to systemic knowledge may not only lower coordination performance in an interface based regime, but may lower performance relative to an unstructured coordination regime.
We explore these intuitions about the viability of an interface-based coordination regime rather than rely on an unstructured coordination regime more rigorously by simulating the dynamic model specified in equations 1-5. The specific functional forms used for equations 1-3 are:
We rely on exponential forms for all three equations to maintain comparability. The parameters in these functions affect the second derivatives in meaningful ways. For instance, the parameters and have meaningful interpretations as "investments in building systemic knowledge and coordination competence" respectively. Increasing these parameters increases the rate at which coordination experience is converted into systemic knowledge and coordination competence respectively. Since our focus in this study is not on the effectiveness with which systemic knowledge embedded into interfaces helps to reduce unstructured coordination, we set =1 in the simulation experiments described below. Unless otherwise mentioned, the settings for the simulation runs used to produce graphs are and though in our analysis we verify results for both parameters in the ) some time must elapse, so that significant differences in coordination experience will result from adopting an interface. Further, the magnitude of i U t ∂ ∂ will decrease over time given the convex decreasing nature of this function. It therefore seems likely that the "volume reduction" effect precedes the "per unit cost increase" effect, so that interface adoption is followed initially by lower coordination costs relative to an unstructured coordination regime. Subsequently coordination costs may rise. If we thought about both and as endogenous variables, the preceding discussion also raises the question whether investments in building systemic knowledge complement or substitute investments in building coordination competence. The tentative answer we suggest is that it depends on the time horizon.
The value of adopting interfaces for coordination
In the short run, investments in building systemic knowledge enhance the value of investments in building coordination competence; in the longer run, such investments may work at cross purposes to each other, as interfaces (and the systemic knowledge they rest upon) slow down the rate at which coordination competence is accumulated.
The timing of interface adoption
Next, we explore the impact of interface adoption on systemic knowledge, and implications for timing interface adoption. Figure 3 Thus, delayed adopters of interfaces enjoy even larger coordination cost advantages over early adopters after the transition in coordination regime if both accumulate coordination competence rapidly.
The impact of shocks to systemic knowledge
To explore the impact of periodic shocks to systemic knowledge-such as technological or organizational innovations which transform the nature of interdependence between units-we modify our model specification to allow for In Figure 6 , we first plot coordination costs during the time window when specifying interfaces improves performance relative to an unstructured coordination regime ( . This is shown by the difference between the lines "with interfaces" and "without interfaces". The third line in yellow represents the average coordination costs for 50 runs of the model, with a 15% probability of a shock in each period that completely destroys the value of systemic knowledge gained through coordination experience. The impact of the shocks, as we conjectured, is to lower performance below that of an unstructured coordination regime towards the end of this time window (see periods 20-40). Put differently, shocks serve to bring forward the crossover point (at which the interface-based regime begins to under-perform the unstructured coordination regime).
This result can be understood in terms of the impact of shocks on the twin consequences of defining interfaces-"volume reduction" and "cost increases". With shocks, the specification of interfaces periodically goes to zero, leading to spikes in the extent of unstructured coordination. This weakens both the coordination volume reduction effect (as shocks increase the extent of unstructured coordination required)
as well as the unit cost increase effect (since cumulative experience at unstructured coordination is likely to be higher with shocks). Since the impact of differences in cumulative coordination experience on the unit costs of coordination are slight initially, but only build up over time, shocks effectively weaken the volume reduction effect more strongly than the cost increase effect; the cross over point therefore "moves" to the left. Figure 7 shows the effect strengthening as the frequency of shocks increases (from a 10% probability of a shock every period -"I-rare" to 30% -"I-frequent"). As shocks become more frequent, the performance of the interface based coordination regime worsens and the crossover point moves to earlier periods. Thus, shocks to systemic knowledge not only lower coordination performance in an interface-based regime, but lower performance relative to an unstructured coordination regime. Put differently, when systemic knowledge is unstable and the underlying patterns of interdependence are frequently changing, building systemic knowledge and defining interfaces that are valid for brief intervals may be worse than sticking with an unstructured coordination regime.
Discussion: Interfaces, Boundaries of Organization & Boundaries of Ownership
Our analysis points to some limits to the usage of interface-based coordination regimes-the advantages of interfaces relative to unstructured coordination decline over time, and when systemic knowledge is unstable and subject to frequent revision, then the advantages of an interface based regime last for an even shorter duration. The gains from interface-based coordination regimes are also smaller for organizations that can build coordination competence rapidly. Finally, organizations that delay the adoption of an interface-based regime are likely to outperform organizations with unstructured coordination regimes for significant periods of time. Organizational interfaces have been at the centre of our analysis, because they are the basis on which the division of activity within and between firms is defined. Rather than simply view such interfaces as a pre-existing alternative to an unstructured coordination regime, we have proposed a dynamic model of how the systemic knowledge necessary to define them builds over time and at the expense of developing competence at unstructured coordination.
Our analysis of the dynamics of the two coordination regimes and their interactions suggests several implications for organizational form, which we discuss below. In keeping with standard theoretical treatments about firm boundaries, we make two assumptions about the difference between intra-and inter-firm contexts:
first, that there is lesser incentive conflict between the two parties interacting through an interface when both are part of the same firm than when they are not (Williamson, 1985; Williamson, 1991) ; and second, that costs of unstructured coordination between the two parties is lower when both are part of the same firm than when they are not (Kogut & Zander, 1992 . These two assumptions characterize transaction cost and the knowledge based perspective respectively, and a point of contention between theorists is the sufficiency of each as an explanation of firm boundaries (Foss, 1996) .
However, that is not our focus; we make both assumptions with a view to understanding how interfaces evolve and confer benefits within the inter-firm as opposed to the intra-firm context.
Implications for ownership and organizational boundaries
Our analysis suggests an endogenous explanation for why interface-based coordination regimes are periodically discarded by organizations in favor of unstructured coordination regimes. Organizations may merge activities separated by departmental/divisional boundaries, re-integrate into vertical segments they have exited, and periodically discard existing standards and rules not necessarily because these become inappropriate due to some exogenous changes to the system, but simply because their value relative to an unstructured coordination regime inevitably declines over time. When systemic knowledge is in flux-the pattern of underlying interdependencies connecting organizational sub-units is changing frequently -this reduces the period in which interfaces confer coordination cost advantages over unstructured coordination regimes, leading to interfaces being discarded more rapidly.
Note that this is not the same as saying that when systemic knowledge is outdated, the interface that is based on this knowledge is less valuable -instead we are arguing that the regime of coordination by interfaces in general becomes less valuable due to the frequency with which interfaces must be re-defined-even if there were no costs to creating each interface (as we have assumed).
Our analysis also suggests that the magnitude of the coordination cost economies from interface-based regimes is diminished in the presence of rapid rates of coordination competence building. This indicates that the adoption of an interfacebased coordination regime is less likely, the faster an organization can bring about improvements in coordination competence through building on coordination experiences. Thus organizational interfaces are more likely to be adopted in established rather than de novo relationships, because of the greater rate at which coordination competence can improve with experience in the latter. Similarly, all else being equal, within firms, coordination competence may develop faster because of common language, low-powered incentives, propinquity and identification-starting from similar initial levels (Monteverde, 1995) . Thus, we would expect that activities performed by different organizational units within a firm are more likely to rely on unstructured coordination, than similar activities coordinated across organizational boundaries. Interface based coordination regimes should be more widespread between rather than within firms -the lower levels of standardization of interactions between units within a firm, compared to similar interactions between firms may in fact be a sign of efficiency.
There are other important differences between organizational interfaces within and between firms that we have not directly examined in our model. For instance, the design of interfaces may involve conflicts of interest cannot be ignored in the context of inter-firm relationships. While we have assumed that having knowledge of the underlying interaction structure is all that is needed to design an interface, actually, selecting the appropriate interface may be more like a coordination game-with multiple equilibria, on which different people may have different preferences. Two organizational units within a firm may have different preferences on which interface to select, but agreement will eventually be reached through the intervention of higher authority, if necessary (Williamson, 1991) . By definition, such a final and effective arbitrator is not available when two independent firms disagree on the interface that they prefer. The implication is that it is harder to create interfaces between rather than within firms; but if an interface exists, it is easier to do business with external organizations.
Our results on the benefits of delaying interface definition till some systemic knowledge has been built underlines two key elements of our theoretical frameworkfirst, that an unstructured coordination regime must precede an interface-based coordination regime, and second that the benefits of interface specification is subject to diminishing marginal returns. Delaying interface definition allows for the build-up of systemic knowledge through unstructured coordination, while once an interface is introduced, the rate at which systemic knowledge is built must diminish (because of the decrease in the extent of unstructured coordination each period). The standardization of coordination must not be rushed-reorganization or vertical disintegration in the aftermath of technological innovations must allow time for systemic knowledge about new patterns of interdependence to be built.
These results also suggest that in general, using organizational interfaces to partition activity is a good idea in the longer term only if there are significant gains from the use of interfaces. Our own analysis has only focused on the coordination costs associated with coordination through interfaces (as opposed to unstructured coordination), but the potential benefits of using interfaces are well known. The idea that specialization gains can arise from controlling cognitive diseconomies of scope is at least as old as Adam Smith's original description of the pin factory. Because wellspecified interfaces allow focusing cognitive resources on a narrower set of actions (production only as opposed to production + coordination), they can lead to static and dynamic improvements in performance. Indeed the formation of well-specified Well-specified interfaces enhance accountability because they describe precisely the acceptable outputs from each sub-unit, and lower measurement costs (Barzel, 1982) , enabling the use of sharp incentives that link rewards to outputs (Zenger & Hesterly, 1997)Jacobides & Billinger; 2006) . Since well-specified interfaces provide clear descriptions of acceptable outputs, they can also result in lower costs of selecting and finding trading partners, and contracting with them (Baldwin and Clark; 2003) . Well-specified interfaces also enable rapid reconfiguration -"mix and match". Individual organizational units (including suppliers) can be replaced by others, while maintaining the overall pattern of interdependence between organizational units if the organizational interfaces that connect them are well specified. This property lies behind the suitability of the Mform organization for conglomerate diversification, and of policies for rapid reassignment of charters to divisions within companies (Galunic & Eisenhardt, 2001b) .
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Interfaces deliver the benefits of rapid reconfiguration even within the inter-firm setting as they can enable firms to switch trading partners rapidly, as Hoetker shows is possible in the laptop industry (2002).
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Since the coordination cost advantages of interface-based regimes decline relative to unstructured coordination regimes in the long run, their adoption is economically rational only when the gains from interfaces-specialization, accountability, rapid re-configuration-are relatively large. Put differently, unstructured coordination regimes may be preferable unless the benefits from interface specification not only exist but are significant.
Conclusion
We see this paper as making three basic contributions. First, technological interfaces in products differ in important ways from organizational interfaces; while the former must be well specified (but may be either thin or thick), the latter need not be. In fact, from an organizational standpoint, thin interfaces are not necessary for most of the gains from modularity. Conversely, variations in the degree of interface specification are important from an organization design perspective, because of gains from reduced coordination costs and enhanced accountability; these concepts have no good analogues in product modularity.
Second, the differences between product and organizational modularity become even more pronounced as we look closer at the process of interface formation. We have argued systemic knowledge is essential for effective interface definition. Since unstructured coordination is an important means by which systemic knowledge is gained, an implication of our arguments is that for novel products, nonmodular organizations may be necessary to develop modular products. Thus, the link between technological and organizational modularity may be stronger in mature technological settings rather than in settings with considerable novelty; existing levels of systemic knowledge may be a powerful moderating variable that helps to explain when product and organizational modularity go together, as well as when they do not.
Third, our analysis suggests that variations in organizational attributes such as the rate at which systemic knowledge and coordination competence is built, and differences in time horizons over which the benefits of interface specification are evaluated can generate considerable variations in the rates of adoption of organizational modularity and the degree of interface specification, even for the same basic technologies. Elaborating on this analytical framework may help us to provide a sophisticated rebuttal to the critique of technological determinism that often hovers over the literature on technological and organizational modularity. We have also sketched out arguments for why ownership may remain integrated despite the existence of organizational interfaces (because of the need for specific investments to conform to an interface), and conversely why interfaces may never form despite ownership already being separated (this can occur if coordination competence is high without a correspondingly high level of systemic knowledge and benefits from modularity).
From a broader theoretical perspective, our research helps address a seeming inconsistency in the knowledge-based view of the firm. For instance, Nickerson and Zenger (2004) recently argued that "the two fundamental arguments within the literature that support the efficiency of firms relative to markets in knowledge exchange are fully contradictory. One claims that hierarchies essentially exist to avoid knowledge transfer, emphasizing the firm's capacity to exercise authority in directing others actions. The other view claims that hierarchies exist instead to facilitate knowledge transfer, emphasizing the firm's capacity to support the formation of shared language and identity". We believe that our discussion shows that far from being contradictory, these two views are complementary: On the basis of the evolutionary dynamics we described, extensive knowledge sharing enhances interface specification which thereafter reduces the need for extensive knowledge sharing over time. The apparent inconsistency highlighted by Nickerson and Zenger disappears if we recognize that the two advantages of hierarchies apply at different levels of systemic knowledge (Nickerson & Zenger, 2004) .
We hope that the framework developed in this paper will help to understand both the benefits and the costs of the two coordination regimes-interface-based and unstructured -as well as their dynamic properties, and lead to a more balanced, empirically grounded descriptive theory, as well as more robust prescriptions for organizational and ownership design. (Markides & Williamson, 1996) Cross-functional teams in product development (Iansiti, 1998) ; collocation of engineers in procurement relationships (Dyer, 1996) ; structural integration in technology acquisitions (Puranam, 2001) Table 2a   Table 2b Task Structure Matrix 
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